Individual Social Security Retirement Accounts by Porter, John E.
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
1995 
Individual Social Security Retirement Accounts 
John E. Porter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Porter, John E., "Individual Social Security Retirement Accounts" (1995). Wharton Pension Research 
Council Working Papers. 606. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/606 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 1997 publication: Positioning Pensions for the 
21st Century. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/606 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Individual Social Security Retirement Accounts 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 1997 publication: Positioning Pensions 
for the 21st Century. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/606 
Positioning Pensions
for the Twenty-First
Century
Edited by Michael S. Gordon,
Olivia S. Mitchell, and Marc M. Twinney
Published by
The Pension Research Council
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
and
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia
Cop>righl :6 19lJ7 The Pen"ion Re;>-.earch Council or Ih~Whanon School
of lhe llni\er~iryuf Pt'nn~;..l\'ania
All right... re5cryed
Pri.nted in Ihe.- CUlled Stale,; ol.\..mc.::rka on acid-free paper
1'1 9 H 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Puhlished b~'
Unin~l"$.ityOfPt'lll1.\d'·ania Pre<;~
Philadelphia. PenJl,,~h'ania1910+61)97
Llhral'\' orCollgres... Cata.login~-iJl-Pllblication D;lIa
96-5:l837
CIP
II. \1irchdl. Olhia S.
PO!,;ILioning PI~Il<;illllS for the n\'fmt~-firstCellt.llr. ,. ('dited b\ ~lichael S. Gordon. Olivia S.
~1ilchell and ~-1an:: ~t. T\dnne.-~.
p. em.
Inclurks bilJliogr.tphical rekrcllces and index.
ISRS 0-81 n-:\~91·3 (at·id·free paper)
1. Pellsinns-llniled States. I. Cordon. \Iirlmtl S.
Ill. T\\·innt~\·. :\Iarc \1.
HD7125.P67 1997
;t'\ I.:!.i ·2·()9i:Hic21
Chapter) 3
Individual Social Security
Retirement Accounts
John E. Porter
1t is time to propose a change in the way we manage the Social Security
Trust Fund reserve, and in this chapter I propose one viable method of
approaching the system's financing problems. My plan, although not a
complete solution to the larger, long-term financial ills ofSocial Security,
would improve the long-term health of Social Security by converting the
Trust Fund reserve from a pile of government IOUs into real savings
controlled by individuals. Indeed, I have always been careful to note the
specific focus of my plan-the management of the Trust Fund reserve.
Clearly, Social Security's larger problems will have to be dealt with at
some time through more comprehensive changes in order for the future
of this vi tal and successful program to be guaranteed.
The purpose of the legislation, known as the Porter Plan, is twofold.
First and foremost, it would take from the government the reserve Social
Security payroll tax revenues, those not needed to pay current benefits
and which are nominally being collected to help pay the baby boom
generation's Social Security benefits. These are currently being spent to
finance present-day deficits. Under the Porter Plan, the reserves would
instead be refunded into mandatory, individually held accounts treated
much like IRAs. This change in legislation would guarantee the avail-
ability of these funds for the baby boom generation's retirement, some-
thing I believe the current policy makes highly unlikely if not altogether
impossible, as will be explained in greater detail below.
Second, by changing the management of the reserve so as to remove
it from the federal government's hands, the government would be forced
to raise more deficit capital in the private markets and the true size of
the annual federal budget deficit would be revealed in sharp relief. I am
hopeful that this change would put additional pressure on Congress and
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the President to cut spending further in order to stem the current,
much-larger-than-understood river of red ink flowing from Washington.
The 1983 Social Security amendments increased Social Security pay-
roll taxes in order to create a reserve within the Social Security Trust
Fund intended to cover the shortfall between the Social Security system's
tax and interest income and its benefit outgo which will occur when the
baby boom generation retires and draws Social Security benefits. At that
time, there will be approximately 25 million more retirees on the Social
Security benefit rolls than there are today without a proportionate in-
crease in taxpaying workers. The reserve is thus designed to protect fu-
ture workers from sharp increases in payroll taxes which would occur
if Social Security were operated under pay-as-you-go financing. While
those tax increases could be mitigated through significant cuts in Social
Security benefits, I doubt the likelihood of such cuts given the apprehen-
sion with which most Members of Congress approach the issue.
In light of the fiscal impact of the baby boomers and the need to pro-
tect future workers from higher taxes, the Trust Fund reserve is a wise
and valuable management tool. Unfortunately, current law governing
the investment and management of the reserve is fueling congressional
profligacy and will eventually undermine the Social Security system.
Each year, the Social Security system receives various tax revenues.
These funds are used first to pay the benefits of current beneficiaries.
Surplus funds remaining after these payments (the annual reserves) are
by law invested in special issue, interest-bearing Treasury bonds. Sur-
pluses "invested" in these bonds are credited on government ledgers to
the Social Security Trust Fund, and the United States Treasury receives
the cash. The Trust Fund surplus, then, is simply a collection of govern-
mentlOUs.
This transfer of reserve cash to the Treasury creates serious problems
since this cash is, from the standpoint of the Treasury, indistinguishable
from any other revenues paid to the federal government. Because cur-
rent law does not require reserve moneys to be set aside or otherwise
saved separately from other government funds, and because the federal
government continues to run annual budget deficits, the reserve funds
are used to finance present-day general operations of the government.
In other words, the Social Security Trust Fund surplUS finances part of
today's deficit spending. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) con-
firmed this analysis when it noted that "as long as the trust fund operates
with an annual surplus, the policy of investing in special issues means
that the government does not have to borrow as much from the public
to finance the deficit in the rest of the government's accounts" (CBO
1994: 1).
If left unchecked, current law governing the Trust Fund reserve will
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cause a serious fiscal crisis when the baby boomers retire. At that time,
the Social Security system will begin redeeming its Treasury bonds in
order to pay retirement benefits. When these transactions take place, the
federal government will have to produce literally hundreds of billions of
dollars in each of several years to pay back the bonds held by Social Se-
curity. Since the money obtained from issuing the bonds will have al-
ready been spent on today's deficits and will not be backed by any real
assets, the government at that time will have to obtain it by either raising
taxes or by sharply cutting spending on other federal programs. If these
options are unpalatable, the government may instead choose to renege
on its promise to the baby boomers and greatly reduce their Social Se-
curity benefits. Each of these options is likely, at the very least, to be eco-
nomically disruptive and politically excruciating.
Because the excess money is simply making it easier for Congress to
continue deficit spending, I have reintroduced legislation which would
reduce Social Security payroll taxes by the amount not needed for
current beneficiaries, namely, about I percent. Both employers and em-
ployees would now be required to contribute .50 percent into mandatory
Individual Social Security Retirement Accounts, or ISSRAs. These lRA-
like accounts would be held in private-sector entities and would accrue
tax-free interest over the working lifetime of the individual. Individual
recipients would own the accounts and would direct bonded ISSRA
trustees-banks, insurance companies, brokers, or other money man-
agers-in investing ISSRA moneys. While the Porter Plan contains no
specific guidelines, I conceive of ISSRA account investments as being
limited by law to safe, non-speculative investments such as time deposits,
government obligations, AAA corporate binds, and certain mutual funds
that would allow money to be saved and invested and grow as a nest egg
for the future. The trustees would be required by law to abide by the
investment guidelines and would only be able to pay the money to pur-
chase an annuity when the owner reaches retirement age. The ISSRA
system would be phased in gradually and would take roughly forty years
to become fully vested. As mentioned above, my legislation affects only
the management of the Trust Fund reserves. It does not change current
law governing replacement rates, cost-of-living adjustments, or sched-
uled changes in the Social Security retirement age.
Under the Porter Plan, an individual's Social Security benefits would
consist of two parts: an annuity purchased with the person's ISSRA funds
and an adjusted payment from the Social Security Trust Fund itself. Pay-
ments from the Trust Fund would be adjusted to ensure that benefits
would remain at the same level as they are today under current law, not
increased by the amount of an individual's ISSRA payment. In a recent
Social Security subcommittee hearing, the CBO criticized the Porter
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Plan because it did not contain an offset mechanism which would en-
sure Social Security's progressive benefit structure. In the revised bill, I
worked with the General Accounting Office of Congress (GAO) to im-
plement a benefit adjustment that would maintain the progressivity
under a mixed private/public Social Security system. GAO's analysis
showed that an ISSRA system could actually increase benefits slightly
given moderately good economic conditions. Interestingly, the analysis
also showed that a 2 percent diversion into ISSRAs conducted during the
period when Social Security was accumulating a reserve would increase
benefits more than would a 1 percent diversion-even with an appropri-
ate benefit adjustment (GAO 1990, 1994). CBO might wish to review
GAO's work in this area, especially since CBO's hearing report largely
discounts the notion that partial privatization would improve benefits.
Thus the Porter Plan would take from Congress the reserve funds it is
supposed to save but which it instead spends on present-day deficit
spending. This change would help protect baby boomers from cuts in
Social Security benefits and protect future workers from huge tax in-
creases. It would prevent the need for enormous future cuts in govern-
ment programs to finance redemption of Social Security's special issue
bonds. At the very least, establishment of an ISSRA system would give
baby boomers the moneys they have in their ISSRAs to use for retire-
ment. Under the current system, they may well end up receiving little if
any money from Social Security given the demographic, fiscal, and Trust
Fund management trends discussed above. Finally, it would force the
federal government to borrow more from public markets to finance the
deficit and thereby make the enonnity of our fiscal problems far more
readily apparent to the general public than it is today.
The Porter Plan has several other positive attributes. First, it would
make every American worker an investor in our economy. Every worker
in America who paid Social Security taxes would have an ISSRA and
would thereby have a tangible stake in the success of our economy. Sec-
ond, Americans who have not otherwise saved during their lifetimes
would have savings that would be theirs, that they would manage, and
which would grow and be available as part of their retirement. Third, it
would give all workers an asset to pass on to their families. Today, if one
dies prior to becoming eligible for Social Security old age benefits, those
benefits are gone except for survivors' benefits in some cases. However,
under my proposal, someone who dies prior to retirement age would
pass on accumulated ISSRA funds as part of his or her estate. Fourth, my
proposal would put US $3 trillion, in 1990 dollars, or at least a very sub-
stantial part of that, into private-sector investments. This infusion of capi-
tal, coupled with an expected drop in the deficit because Congress would
not have the reserve to spend, should help drive down interest rates and
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speed future economic growth. Finally, my plan would create the basis of
a completely portable private pension system. In other words, if I were a
worker directing part of my Social Security into an ISSRA with every pay-
check, I would go to my employer and say, "Forget the pension plan. I
want my share paid into my ISSRA account." Years later when I am about
to retire, I would not have to won)' about whether the pension plan of
the company had been mismanaged or stolen or gone broke. I would
have the money in my own hands. I would have invested it and I would
know that it is available for my retirement.
I realize that one criticism my colleagues might have of the ISSRA plan
as described here is that the investment guidelines allow people to invest
in Treasury bills, something I am trying on one level to prevent the gov-
ernment from doing. My answer is that allowing such investments leaves
the choice up to the individual rather than having the government do so
on autopilot, as under current law. I would note that a greater propor-
tion of federal debt instruments would be held by American citizens, not
foreign creditors.
I believe that most of us in Congress and, indeed, many members of
the public understand the fact that the Trust Fund reserve is not real,
that it has been spent, continues to be spent, and exists only on paper.
Few if any of us really believe Social Security will have the money it
needs to work as it should when the baby boomers retire and the system's
"special issues" come due. We must soberly face this issue as an insti-
tution and change law accordingly. I offer the Porter Plan as a positive
way to do so.
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